Some data recently reported as evidence for the hypothesis that aphasic patients exhibit a set to acquiesce are shown not to support that hypothesis when the control data are taken into account. Several factors that need to be considered in research on this type of problem are noted. The broader issues concerning the usage of "yes" and "no" in cases of aphasia, which underlie this research, hold some interesting implications for the development of a theory of language. These phenomena are briefly discussed.
Some data recently reported as evidence for the hypothesis that aphasic patients exhibit a set to acquiesce are shown not to support that hypothesis when the control data are taken into account. Several factors that need to be considered in research on this type of problem are noted. The broader issues concerning the usage of "yes" and "no" in cases of aphasia, which underlie this research, hold some interesting implications for the development of a theory of language. These phenomena are briefly discussed.
In a recent article, Jenkins and Schuell (196S) offer data from which they conclude that aphasic patients exhibit a set to agree or acquiesce when answering questions put to them. The issue is of theoretical interest beyond its practical implications for the construction of tests for aphasia, because of its indirect bearing on the question whether assertion or negation is better preserved in aphasia and thus more deeply seated in the language mechanism. When their data are carefully examined, however, they are found not to support the notion of an acquiescence set. The reasons are set forth in this paper. Because some of the general issues raised by their research nevertheless remain of interest, certain phenomena of aphasic language that must enter into consideration of those issues are indicated later.
The data supplied by Jenkins and Schuell (196S) consist of the errors made by 30 normal subjects and by more than SO aphasic patients who answered "yes" or "no" to a series of verbal statements. Sixty statements, divided into four tests of IS statements each, were used. The differences between these tests need not be considered here; it will suffice to note that half the items in each test called for an affirmative answer ("Is an orange a fruit?") and half called for a negative answer ("Are towns bigger than cities?"). If the subjects commit more errors on the items that call for negative answers, a set for acquiescence is said to exist. This is indeed the 1 The preparation of this paper was supported by research grant MH 08472-03 from the National Institutes of Health, United States Public Health Service.
case for their aphasic patients, and the difference is shown by statistical test to be reliable. So runs their argument.
The trouble lies in the data from their control group. For convenience let us term an error where a subject says "yes" to a question demanding a negative answer a false-positive error, and one where a subject says "no" to a question demanding a positive answer a false-negative error. To establish that aphasic patients have an acquiescence set the authors must show, not simply that the patients make more false-positive errors than false-negative errors, but that the excess of errors in this direction is greater for patients than for normal subjects. Otherwise there is no basis for asserting that the "acquiescence set" they found in the data from their patients is in any way associated with aphasia. Now, the error rates for their normal subjects, to no one's surprise, are much lower than their rates for their patients: less than a tenth, in fact. Jenkins and Schuell dismissed these data with the remark that their normal subjects showed "virtually no tendency" to make more errors of the false-positive kind.
By dismissing their control data, Jenkins and Schuell have in effect introduced an implicit a priori assumption that on their tests normal subjects give false-positive and false-negative errors in equal proportions. Only on that hypothesis would the significant difference they found for their group of aphasics permit the conclusion they drew. But this assumption can hardly be accepted at face value. It is much easier, generally speaking, to construct difficult items demanding negative answers than equally difficult items demanding positive answers-as the reader may easily satisfy himself by trying his hand at a few. The art of phrasing questions thus contains a built-in bias that tends to produce a spurious appearance of an acquiescence set. On examination, in fact, their control data do give evidence of this tendency. Pooling the data from all four tests we find that their normal subjects made a total of 87 falsepositive errors on the 960 negative items and only S false-negative errors on the 840 positive items. The difference between these proportions is significant at the .001 level (u -8.47; using the arc sine transformation to equate variances, u -9.65). In their discussion, Jenkins and Schuell argue that the results for their Test IV, which are the most unfavorable to their hypothesis, are affected by an artifact. If we accept this argument and eliminate the data from that test, we find that the error proportions for the control subjects on Tests I-III are 15/720 for falsepositive and only 5/630 for false-negative errors, a difference significant at the .05 level (u = 2.03). Thus despite the smaller sample, their control subjects show the same tendency to "acquiesce" that they found with their aphasics.
To justify their conclusion, then, one cannot simply show that a significant difference exists between the number of false-positive and false-negative errors made by the aphasics. Instead, one must test the hypothesis that the excess of false-positive over falsenegative errors is greater for the aphasics than for the normals. For this purpose the statistical approach adopted by Jenkins and Schuell is an unfortunate choice. They applied t tests to the differences between the number of false-positive and false-negative errors committed by the patients on each test. To test the appropriate hypothesis in this way it would be necessary to compare these values with the results of tests of equal Power applied to the control group. Since the power function of the t test depends on the number of observations, it would be necessary to expand their control group until the total number of errors they produced is as great as the number produced by the patients. This would require a control group about 20 times as large as the one they used, to judge from the error rates they report. With a smaller set of observations, a t test is more likely to result in an error of inference of the second kind, in which the value of t falls below the critical level when in fact a true difference between means exists.
These difficulties can be avoided by expressing the data as ratios instead of differences. Let R be the ratio of false-negative to false-positive errors. A tendency to acquiesce is then indicated by R < 1. On the hypothesis proposed by Jenkins and Schuell, that an acquiescence set is associated with aphasia, R should be significantly smaller for their aphasic patients than for their normal control subjects. Since the ratios represent unbiased estimates of population values, unlike the differences, they can be compared legitimately despite the greater number of errors made by the patients. Table 1 presents these ratios calculated from the data supplied by Jenkins and Schuell in their Table 1 . For three of their four subtests the ratios are greater for the aphasics than for the normals, contrary to their hypothesis. If the data from all four tests are pooled, the ratios are 0.07 for the control group and 0.40 for the aphasics. If we accept the argument that Test IV is artifactual 2 and pool only the data from Tests I-III, the ratios are 0.38 for the control group and 0.41 for the aphasics, still in the direction contrary to their hypothesis.
Clearly, then, the data reported do not support the notion that aphasics have a greater tendency to acquiesce than normal subjects. Both normal and aphasic subjects, it may be observed, produce more than twice as many false-positive as false-negative errors. This fact bears out the point made earlier, that there is a natural tendency for questions phrased in the positive form to be easier than questions phrased in the negative form.
While their conclusion must be abandoned in the fact of the above analysis, the general topic upon which Jenkins and Schuell focus attention-namely, the use of simple positive and negative utterances in aphasia-is one that contains much that is of interest. These phenomena hold implications that are of some significance for the theory of normal language processes as well as for the evaluation of aphasic disorders themselves.
Very frequently, "yes" and "no" are the first words that the aphasic patient uses appropriately in the early stages of his recovery. Often they remain his only functional words for long periods of time. This in itself is not surprising, since recovery of vocabulary in aphasia generally follows the frequency of occurrence of words (Howes, 1964) and these are among the most fre-2 The argument made by Jenkins and Schuell is that in Test IV the subject faces what is essentially a proofreading task, which is especially conducive to errors of the false-positive kind. This argument, although ad hoc, is plausible as far as it goes; yet it does not fully account for their results on that test. Their aphasics, while making hardly more false-positive errors than the normals on this test, managed to commit more false-negative errors here than on any other test (see Table 1 ). The ratio of false-negative to false-positive errors for aphasics, in fact, is hardly distinguishable from the ratio based on the other three tests (0.40 compared to 0.41). Since the error proportions are more reliable for the aphasics than for the normals, it may well be that the absence of false-negative errors by the normal subjects on Test IV is only accidental and would disappear with a larger sample. Otherwise we are left with the interesting, but rather startling, conclusion that aphasic patients are much better at proofreading, relatively speaking, than are normal subjects. Their argument for ignoring the data from Test IV can therefore be accepted only with reservation. quent words in the language other than connective or interstitial words that have no prepositional significance when used in isolation. The concepts that these words denote, moreover, are perhaps the simplest possible from a logical point of view.
But the phenomena associated with the usage of these two little words are far too rich, in normal speech as well as in aphasia, to be encompassed by a purely logical analysis. A delightful article by Critchley (1961) establishes this point with an array of illustrations, as amusing as they are informative, that range widely over the special features presented by "yes" and "no" in various languages and special situations. With regard to the recovery of these words in aphasia, it would be difficult to improve upon the account given by Hughlings Jackson over 80 years ago (Jackson, 1879 (Jackson, -1880 (Jackson, , reprinted 1958 ; cf. pages 174-178 of the reprinted edition). Some of these phenomena are worth recapitulating here briefly both for their bearing upon the testing procedures used by Jenkins and Schuell and for the implications they hold for certain current approaches to the theory of language.
It is by no means uncommon for a patient to recover one or the other of these words without the other; or, again, one or the other word may appear as a recurrent or automatic utterance. In such cases the patient is apt to convey his answer to a query calling for a "yes" or "no" answer by extraverbal means. Thus if he has recovered the use of "no" alone, the patient may nod his head emphatically while saying "no" to indicate a positive answer; or he may register his intent by saying "no" with the rising intonation commonly associated with "yes"; or he may repeatedly attempt to say the correct answer, coming out with "no" every time but conveying his meaning unmistakably by an evident display of disgust when the wrong word once more emerges. Other methods, sometimes quite cleverly conceived and often amusing, may be hit upon by a patient to communicate the opposite of what he actually says.
These characteristics of aphasic language would have to be taken into account before one could interpret any positive findings from tests like those reported by Jenkins and Schuell. Suppose, for the moment, that their results had shown a significantly greater proportion of false-positive errors for aphasic subjects compared with normals. A statistically significant difference might result simply if "yes" were a recurrent utterance for one or two of the patients in their series. Yet the full set of facts still would not, in that case, justify a conclusion that there is a set to acquiesce in aphasic patients. The distribution of errors in the different patients is of vital importance in studies of this kind, and in our hypothetical example would suggest the true nature of the result.
An empirical question with interesting theoretical implications, which lies at the heart of the issue posed by Jenkins and Schuell, is whether "yes" or "no" is more often preserved (or first recovered) in aphasia (Critchley, 1961) . No data on this point, to my knowledge, have been produced. From a logical standpoint, one might expect the one to occur as often as the other, or perhaps expect "yes," as the simpler concept requiring no change, to predominate. Yet most experienced observers have the general impression that, if there is any difference at all, "no" more often returns first. (It was the discrepancy between this and the Jenkins and Schuell conclusion, in fact, which led to reexamination of their data.) The frequency of "no" in the Lorge Count (Thorndike & Lorge, 1944 ) is over five times greater than the frequency of "yes"; but these data are for written language, and, as Critchley emphasizes, "yes" and "no" are above all elements of conversational speech rather than written language. Some data on the course of recovery of these primordial words in aphasia might provide a valuable clue to the nature of the processes that govern the embedding of words in the language mechanism.
The manner in which aphasics use and misuse these two words raises a serious question about the relevance of one of the main lines of approach to a theory of language that is followed in psychology. Consider the patient who repeatedly says "no" to a query he wants to answer with "yes," but who communicates his meaning by the disgust he displays when he emits the wrong word again and again. The language mechanism here has been reduced to a rudimentary state without appreciable disturbance of meaning or cognition. Clearly, then, there are at least two physiologically distinct processes at work, whatever names one wishes to assign to them. One therefore can hardly hope to determine the properties of one of those processes from an analysis of the other. Yet this is precisely the course taken by those schools of thought that treat language as a cognitive, symbolic, or semiotic process which can be approached through an analysis of meanings and concepts. Not that those matters are not worth investigation in their own right; but we should not confuse them with the verbal, or language, processes that are damaged in cases of aphasia.
The distinction between these two types of process, although apparent from many of the properties of both normal and aphasic speech, is nowhere more dramatic than in the aphasic patient's use of "yes" and "no." Thus, in its general form, the problem raised by Jenkins and Schuell remains one of considerable interest, despite the negation of their specific conclusion.
